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Abstract
It is argued that quantum logic and quantum probability theory are
fascinating mathematical theories but without any relevance to our real
world.
1 Introduction
At the beginning of this century, which is sometimes called the century of
physics, we were presented with two revolutionary physical theories: the theory
of relativity and the quantum theory. The common feature of these theories
(and, perhaps, of the whole physics in this century) is their counterintuitive
character. It would be beyond the scope of this paper to analyze the intel-
lectual background at the turn of the century that made scientists so much
attracted by everything against intuition. No doubt, in the twenties century
physics “the logical basis is getting farther and farther from the empirical data,
and the mental way leading to theorems directly related to the empirical ob-
servations is getting more and more long and hard” (Einstein, 1938). I believe,
however, that in quantum mechanics we swung to the other extreme by enforcing
counterintuitive abstractions, instead of struggling for real explanations.
The target of my critique is the quantum probability theory and quantum
logic. The story begins with von Neumann’s recognition1, that quantum me-
chanics can be regarded as a kind of probability theory defined over the subspace
lattice L(H) of a Hilbert space H . This recognition was confirmed by the Glea-
son theorem:
∗E-mail: leszabo@ludens.elte.hu
1This idea first appeared in Neumann 1932. One can find it in a more explicit and somewhat
different form in Birkhoff and Neumann 1936.
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Definition 1 A non negative real function µ on L(H) is called a probability
measure if µ(H) = 1 and if whenever E1, E2, . . . are pairwise orthogonal sub-
spaces, and E =
∨∞
i=1 Ei, then µ(E) =
∑∞
i=1 µ(Ei).
Theorem 1 (Gleason 1957) If H is a real or complex Hilbert space of dimen-
sion greater than 2, and µ is a probability measure on L(H), then there exists
a density operator W on H, such that (∀E ∈ L(H)) [µ(E) = tr(WE)].2
Formally, the intersection and the (closed) linear union of subspaces play
the role of conjunction and disjunction in an underlying event lattice of a prob-
ability theory. In spite of some difficulties, it is commonly accepted that, for
example, a conjunction A∧B, represented by the intersection of the correspond-
ing subspaces, A ∩ B, corresponds to an event, which is nothing else, but the
joint occurrence of events A and B. However, we have, as we will see it soon,
many difficulties with such an interpretation! While everything is clear from
the mathematical point of view, the physical meaning assigned to the elements
of the subspace lattice and to the lattice operations is far from obvious.
The quantum probability — quantum logic approach is based on the convic-
tion that there are phenomena described by quantum mechanics which cannot
be accommodated in the classical Kolmogorov theory of probability. The major-
ity of authors are shearing this conviction: Jauch (1968), Bub (1974), Putnam
(1974), Piron (1976), Mittelstaedt (1978), Beltrametti and Cassinelli (1981),
Gudder (1988), Pitowsky (1989), Ku¨mmerer and Maassen (1996) and many
others. Due to Feynmann (1951) this opinion is quite common among the users
of quantum mechanics but who do not care to much with foundational questions.
There has been a serious critique against this approach. The first paper
pointing out the pitfalls of quantum logic was published by Strauss (1937) a year
after the famous Birkhoff and Neumann (1936). It is also worth mentioning a few
papers of the last years arguing against non-classical probabilities: Ballentine
(1989), Costantini (1992), Szabo´ (1995a,b), Gill (1996). It seems to me that
quantum probabilitists completely ignore the serious pitfalls pointed out by
these authors. Bell expressed quite a similar disappointment:
Why did such serious people take so seriously axioms which now seem
so arbitrary? I suspect that they were misled by the pernicious mis-
use of the word ‘measurement’ in contemporary theory. This word
very strongly suggests the ascertaining of some preexisting property
of some thing, any instrument involved playing a purely passive role.
Quantum experiments are just not like that, as we learned especially
from Bohr. The results have to be regarded as the joint product of
‘system’ and ‘apparatus,’ the complete experimental set-up. But the
misuse of the word ‘measurement’ makes it easy to forget this and
2The subspaces, the corresponding projectors and the corresponding events are denoted
by the same letter.
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then to expect that the ‘results of measurements’ should obey some
simple logic in which the apparatus is not mentioned. The resulting
difficulties soon show that any such logic is not ordinary logic. It is
my impression that the whole vast subject of ‘Quantum Logic’ has
arisen in this way from the misuse of a word. I am convinced that
the word ‘measurement’ has now been so abused that the field would
be significantly advanced by banning its use altogether, in favor for
example of the word ‘experiment.’ (Bell 1987, p. 166.)
My aim is to show in this paper that, beyond their vagueness and coun-
terintuitiveness, quantum logic and quantum probability theory are needless
and inadequate, because there is nothing in reality described by these math-
ematical constructions. In Section 2 I will show that whenever we consider
non-commuting element of L(H) nonsensical “probabilities” can appear which
can hardly be interpreted as relative frequencies of any events. In Section 3 two
often quoted examples, the double slit experiment and the EPR experiment are
analyzed. These examples are usually meant to illustrate why we need to create
a new, non-classical theory of probability. In both cases, however, it will be
shown that no need to supersede the Kolmogorov theory of probability. In Sec-
tion 4 we will see how can quantum phenomena, in general, be accommodated
in the classical Kolmogorov theory of probability.
2 Nonsensical probabilities
Sometimes quantum mechanics produces very strange values of “probabilities”.
Let me give a simple example.
2.1 Example I
Consider a system described in a 2-dimensional Hilbert space H2. Let ϕ and
ψ be two orthogonal unit vectors. Suppose that the system is in the pure
state W = Pϕ. Consider non-commuting elements of L(H
2): let E1 be the
one-dimensional subspace spanned by (cos θ)ϕ + (sin θ)ψ and E2 the subspace
spanned by (cos θ)ϕ− (sin θ)ψ. The intersection is E1 ∩E2 = ∅. The probabil-
ities of the corresponding events are
p(E1) = tr(WE1) = cos
2 θ,
p(E2) = tr(WE2) = cos
2 θ,
p(E1 ∧ E2) = tr(W (E1 ∩ E2)) = 0.
If θ is close to zero then, for example,
p(E1) = 0.9, p(E2) = 0.9, while p(E1 ∧E2) = 0.
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It is, however, impossible to interpret similar numbers as relative frequencies
of occurrences of E1, E2 and E1 ∧E2. One cannot classify the possible histories
of the universe in such a way, that 90% of them contains event E1, 90% of them
contains E2, but none of them contains both E1 and E2.
It is easy to see, that probabilities cannot be interpreted as relative frequen-
cies if the following inequality is violated:
p(E1) + p(E2)− p(E1 ∧ E2) ≤ 1. (1)
To better understand the significance of the above example it is necessary
to make a few remarks:
• If E1 and E2 commute then inequality (1) is always satisfied.
• At first sight one could think that the difficulties related with conjunctions
occur only if the system is in a special state. But, it is easy to see that
for each state one can find elements of L(H), for which inequality (1) is
violated.
• From the point of view of violation of inequality (1) the complementarity
of E1 and E2 is irrelevant. One can easily create a similar example in
space H3), such that E1 ∧ E2 6= ∅ but inequality (1 is violated. The
violation of inequality (1) means a more serious difficulty than the problem
of complementary observables.
• Equation
p(E1 ∨E2) = p(E1) + p(E2)− p(E1 ∧E2) (2)
implies inequality (1). Remarkably, von Neumann regarded (2) as a fun-
damental property of a probability measure, which should be required in
the quantum case, too.(Cf. Re´dei, forthcoming)
2.2 Does non-commutativity always bear the danger of
nonsensical probabilities?
It is not surprising that the appearance of nonsensical probabilities is related
with non-commutative projectors. I must, however, emphasize that the natural-
ity of this fact does not justify at all the adherence to nonsensical probabilities.
Theorem 2 Let E1 and E2 be non-commuting elements of L(H). There exists
a pure state Ψ for which the probabilities violate inequality (1):
〈Ψ, E1Ψ〉+ 〈Ψ, E2Ψ〉 − 〈Ψ, (E1 ∧ E2Ψ)〉 > 1.
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Proof
Arbitrary E1 and E2 can be written in the following form:
E1 = (E1 ∧ E2) ∨ A,
E2 = (E1 ∧ E2) ∨B, (3)
such that A⊥E1 ∧E2 and B⊥E1 ∧E2.
First we prove the following statements:
(a) A 6= ∅ and B 6= ∅ and A 6= B.
(b) A 6⊥ B.
Indeed, if A = ∅ or B = ∅ or A = B would hold then either
E1 < E2 or E2 < E1, that would contradict to the assumed non-
commutativity of E1 and E2. For proving (b) we show that from
A⊥B also the commutativity of E1 and E2 would follow. Commu-
tativity is equivalent with E1 = (E1 ∧ E2) ∨ (E1 ∧ E⊥2 ). Using (3)
we have
(E1 ∧E2) ∨
[
((E1 ∧ E2) ∨ A) ∧ ((E1 ∧E2) ∨B)
⊥
]
= (E1 ∧ E2) ∨
[
((E1 ∧ E2) ∨ A) ∧
(
(E1 ∧ E2)
⊥ ∧B⊥
)]
(4)
= (E1 ∧ E2) ∨
[
((E1 ∧ E2) ∨ A) ∧ (E1 ∧ E2)
⊥] ∧B⊥
Since A⊥(E1 ∧ E2), the distributivity holds in the square brackets.
Therefore we can continue (4) as follows:
= (E1 ∧ E2) ∨ (A ∧B
⊥)
= (E1 ∧ E2) ∨ A = E1
which proves (b).
Now, from (a) and (b) it follows that there exists at least one nor-
malized vector Ψ ∈ A such that Ψ 6∈ B. Such a Ψ is a state vector
for which the inequality
〈Ψ, E1Ψ〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
1
+ 〈Ψ, E2Ψ〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
−〈Ψ, (E1 ∧ E2Ψ)〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
0
> 1 (5)
holds. ✷
The strange meaning of (5) is obvious! If E1 happens with certainty, how
can E2 occur without E1?
Thus, our partial conclusion can be this: 1) L(H) can hardly play the role of
an “algebra of events” for a probability theory. 2) The number tr(WE) cannot
be interpreted as the “relative frequency” of an event.
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3 Do we really need quantum probability theory
and quantum logic?
3.1 Example II: The double slit experiment
Our next example is the double slit experiment which is often quoted in order
to justify why we need quantum probability theory (Fig. 1).
Denote p(A) the probability of that “the particle arrives at a given point of
the screen, Q, when only slit 1 is open”. p(B) denotes the similar probability
for slit 2. In the experiment one finds that
p(A) + p(B) 6= p(A ∨B), (6)
where p(A ∨ B) stands for the probability of “the particle arrives at point Q
either through slit 1 or slit 2”. According to the usual interpretation the double
slit experiment shows that “the method of computing probabilities involving sub-
atomic particles is different from that of classical probability theory” (Gudder
1988, p. 57). Therefore we must, as the usual conclusion says, 1) change prob-
abilities for complex amplitudes (Feynmann) or 2) give up the Booleanan event
lattice (Quantum Logic) and classical probability theory(Quantum Probability
Theory).
Contrary to these conclusions, let me ask:
3.2 Why don’t we analyze the double slit example more
carefully?
There are two different ways in which we can correctly describe the double slit
experiment within the framework of classical probability theory. In both cases,
it is the precise usage of notions “event” and “disjunction” what makes the
classical probability theory satisfactory, while the formula (6) is, as we will see
it soon, based on the misuse of these notions.
Version I
We must precisely distinguish the following events:
A: “Slit 1 is open and slit 2 is closed and the particle is detected at Q”
B: “Slit 1 is closed and slit 2 is open and the particle is detected at Q”
C: “Slit 1 is open and slit 2 is open and the particle is detected at Q”
Obviously,
A ∨B 6= C.
Consequently we are not surprised that
p(A ∨B) = p(A) + p(B) 6= p(C).
6
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Figure 1: According to the usual interpretation the double slit experiment indi-
cates that the rules of computing probabilities in quantum mechanics must be
different from that of classical probability theory.
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Figure 2: The Aspect experiment with spin- 12 particles
That is, formula (6) is incorrect, consequently there is no violation of classical
rules of probability calculation.
Version II
There is only one event:
D: “The particle is detected at Q”
There are, however, different conditions under which the probabilities are un-
derstood. But the Kolmogorov axioms are meant to apply to probabilities be-
longing to one common system of conditions! Consequently, it does not mean
a violation of the Kolmogorov axioms if
p1 is open; 2 is closed(D) + p1 is closed; 2 is open(D) 6= p1 is open; 2 is open(D).
3.3 Example III: The EPR experiment
We have seen in the previous subsection that the double slit experiment does
not prove the nonapplicability of Kolmogorov’s classical theory of probability.
It is true, however, that this example is not regarded as a serious one: it is
rather used in the quantum mechanics text books only. In this subsection we
are going to analyze the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen experiment which is regarded
as a crucial – empirically tested – situation providing probabilities which do not
conform with the Kolmogorovian theory.
Consider an Aspect-type EPR experiment with spin- 12 particles (Fig. 2). The
four detectors detect the spin-up events. The two switches are making choice
from sending the particles to the Stern-Gerlach magnets directed into different
directions. The observed events are the followings:
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A : The “left particle has spin ‘up’ along direction a” detector beeps
A′ : The “left particle has spin ‘up’ along direction a′” detector beeps
B : The “right particle has spin ‘up’ along direction b” detector beeps
B′ : The “right particle has spin ‘up’ along direction b′” detector beeps
a : The left switch selects direction a
a′ : The left switch selects direction a′
b : The right switch selects direction b
b′ : The right switch selects direction b′
For the probabilities of these events, in case of 6 (a, a′) = 6 (a′,b) = 6 (a,b′) =
120◦ and 6 (b, a′) = 0, we have
p(A) = p(A′) = p(B) = p(B′) =
1
4
,
p(a) = p(a′) = p(b) = p(b′) =
1
2
,
p(A ∧ a) = p(A) =
1
4
,
p(A′ ∧ a′) = p(A′) =
1
4
,
p(B ∧ b) = p(B) =
1
4
,
p(B′ ∧ b′) = p(B′) =
1
4
,
p(A ∧ a′) = p(A′ ∧ a) = p(B ∧ b′) = p(B′ ∧ b) = 0, (7)
p(A ∧B) = p(A ∧B′) = p(A′ ∧B′) =
3
32
,
p(A′ ∧B) = 0,
p(a ∧ a) = p(b ∧ b′) = 0,
p(a ∧ b) = p(a ∧ b′) = p(a′ ∧ b) = p(a′ ∧ b′) =
1
4
,
p(A ∧ b) = p(A ∧ b′) = p(A′ ∧ b) = p(A′ ∧ b′)
= p(B ∧ a) = p(B ∧ a′) = p(B′ ∧ a) = p(B′ ∧ a′) =
1
8
.
These statistical data agree with quantum mechanical results, in the following
sense:
p(A ∧ a)
p(a)
= tr(WˆA) =
p(A′ ∧ a′)
p(a′)
= tr(WˆA′)
=
p(B ∧ b)
p(b)
= tr(WˆB) =
p(B′ ∧ b′)
p(b′)
= tr(WˆB′) =
1
2
,
p(A ∧B ∧ a ∧ b)
p(a ∧ b)
=
p(A ∧B)
p(a ∧ b)
= tr(WˆAB)
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=
1
2
sin2 6 (a,b) =
3
8
,
p(A ∧B′ ∧ a ∧ b′)
p(a ∧ b′)
=
p(A ∧B′)
p(a ∧ b′)
= tr(WˆAB′)
=
1
2
sin2 6 (a,b′) =
3
8
, (8)
p(A′ ∧B ∧ a′ ∧ b)
p(a′ ∧ b)
=
p(A′ ∧B)
p(a′ ∧ b)
= tr(WˆA′B)
=
1
2
sin2 6 (a′,b) = 0,
p(A′ ∧B′ ∧ a′ ∧ b′)
p(a′ ∧ b′)
=
p(A′ ∧B′)
p(a′ ∧ b′)
= tr(WˆA′B′)
=
1
2
sin2 6 (a′,b′) =
3
8
,
where the outcomes are identified with the following projectors
A = Pˆ
span
{
ψ+a⊗ψ+a,ψ+a⊗ψ−a
},
A′ = Pˆ
span
{
ψ+a′⊗ψ+a′ ,ψ+a′⊗ψ−a′
},
B = Pˆ
span
{
ψ−b⊗ψ+b,ψ+b⊗ψ+b
},
B′ = Pˆ
span
{
ψ−b′⊗ψ+b′ ,ψ+b′⊗ψ+b′
}
of the Hilbert space H2 ⊗H2. The state of the system is assumed to be repre-
sented by Wˆ = PˆΨs , where Ψs =
1√
2
(ψ+a ⊗ ψ−a − ψ−a ⊗ ψ+a).
The question we would like to answer is whether the above probabilities,
measured in the Aspect experiment, can be accommodated in a Kolmogorovian
probability model, or not.
3.4 The Pitowsky formalism
Pitowsky elaborated a convenient geometric language for the discussion of the
problem whether empirically given probabilities are Kolmogorovian or not (Pi-
towsky, 1989).
Let S be a set of pairs of integers S ⊆ {{i, j} | 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n}. Denote by
R(n, S) the linear space of real vectors having a form like (f1, f2, ...fij , ...). For
each ε ∈ {0, 1}n, let uε be the following vector in R(n, S):
uε = εi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
uεij = εiεj , {i, j} ∈ S.
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Definition 2 The classical correlation polytope C(n, S) is the closed convex
hull in R(n, S) of vectors {uε}ε∈{0,1}n :
C(n, S) :=

a ∈ R(n, S) | a = ∑
ε∈{0,1}n
λεu
ε, where λε ≥ 0 and
∑
ε∈{0,1}n
λε = 1

 .
Consider now eventsA1, A2, . . . An and some of their conjunctionsAi∧Aj ({i, j} ∈ S).
Assume that we know their probabilities from which we can form a so called
correlation vector :
p = (p1, p2, . . . pn, . . . pij , . . .)
= (p(A1), p(A2), . . . , p(An), . . . p(Ai ∧ Aj), . . .) ∈ R(n, S).
Definition 3 We will then say that p has a Kolmogorovian representation if
there exist a Kolmogorovian probability space (Ω,Σ, µ) and measurable subsets
XA1 , XA2 , . . . XAn ∈ Σ,
such that
pi = µ (XAi) , 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
pij = µ
(
XAi ∩XAj
)
, {i, j} ∈ S.
Pitowsky’s theorem tells us the necessary and sufficient condition a correlation
vector must satisfy in order to be Kolmogorovian.
Theorem 3 (Pitowsky, 1989) A correlation vector
p = (p1, p2, . . . pn, . . . pij , . . .)
has a Kolmogorovian representation if and only if p ∈ C(n, S).
In case n = 4 and S = S4 =
{
1, 3}, {1, 4}, {2, 3}, {2, 4}
}
the condition
p ∈ C(n, S) is equivalent with the following inequalities:
0 ≤ pij ≤ pi ≤ 1,
0 ≤ pij ≤ pj ≤ 1, i = 1, 2 j = 3, 4
pi + pj − pij ≤ 1,
−1 ≤ p13 + p14 + p24 − p23 − p1 − p4 ≤ 0, (9)
−1 ≤ p23 + p24 + p14 − p13 − p2 − p4 ≤ 0,
−1 ≤ p14 + p13 + p23 − p24 − p1 − p3 ≤ 0,
−1 ≤ p24 + p23 + p13 − p14 − p2 − p3 ≤ 0.
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(9) reminds us the well known Clauser-Horne inequalities (Clauser and Shimony
1978).3
Let us now apply inequalities (9) to the Aspect experiment in the usual way:
Let
p1 = tr(WˆA), p2 = tr(WˆA
′), p3 = tr(WˆB), p4 = tr(WˆB′),
p13 = tr(WˆABˆ), p14 = tr(WˆAB
′), p23 = tr(WˆA′B), p24 = tr(WˆA′B′),
the values of which are given in (8). Substituting these values into the last
inequality of (9) we find that
p =
(
1
2
,
1
2
,
1
2
,
1
2
,
3
8
,
3
8
, 0,
3
8
)
6∈ C(n, S). (10)
Thus, we can draw the usual conclusion: the probabilities observed in the Aspect
experiment have no Kolmogorovian representation.
However, as I pointed out in my (1995a,b), a closer analysis yields a different
conclusion! On the basis of particular examples I formulated the following hy-
pothesis (Cf. 1995a). There is a “Kolmogorovian Censorship” in the real world:
We never encounter “naked” quantum probabilities in reality. A correlation
vector consisting of empirically testable probabilities is always a product
(p1 . . . pn . . . pij . . .) = (pi1 . . . pin . . . piij . . .) · (p˜1 . . . p˜n . . . p˜ij . . .)
= (pi1p1 . . . pinpn . . . piijpij . . .) ,
where (pi1 . . . pin . . . piij . . .) are quantum probabilities and (p˜1 . . . p˜n . . . p˜ij . . .)
are classical probabilities with which the corresponding measurements happen
to be performed. The hypothesis says that such a product is always classical.
(From the pure mathematical point of view, a product of a quantum and a
classical correlation vector is not necessarily classical.) One can prove such a
theorem within the framework of quite general assumptions (See Bana and Durt
1996).
Again, we must notice that Pitowsky theorem and, consequently, inequalities
(9) apply to probabilities understood under one common system of conditions.
Thus, we make a serious mistake by substituting conditional probabilities (8)
into inequalities (9), since these conditional probabilities belong to different
conditions.
4 How to join probability models?
3There is, however, an important conceptual disagreement between (9) and the original
Clauser-Horne inequalities, see Szabo´ (1995b).
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mB
1$
Figure 3: The probabilities of Heads (H) and Tails (T) are different if the
magnetic field is on.
4.1 How to do it in the classical theory?
As we can see in the above examples, quantum mechanics produces Kolmogoro-
vian probabilities belonging to different sets of conditions. The alleged impos-
sibility to put these classical probability measures together into one common
Kolmogorovian probability model is what urges us to cry for Quantum Proba-
bility Theory and Quantum Logic. But we can join these probability measures,
if we do it in a correct way!
Before to seeing how we can do that, let us consider how this procedure goes
in the classical theory of probability.
Let me take a simple example. We are tossing a coin which has a little
magnetic momentum (Fig. 3). If the magnetic field is off, the probabilities are
poff(H) = 0.5,
poff(T) = 0.5.
If the magnetic field is on, the probabilities are different:
pon(H) = 0.2,
pon(T) = 0.8.
The event algebra A is shown in Figure 4. Probability models (A, poff)
and (A, pon) are, separately, Kolmogorovian. For example, they satisfy inequal-
ity (1):
poff(H) + poff(T)− poff(H ∧T) ≤ 1, (11)
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Figure 4: Algebra of events A
and separately,
pon(H) + pon(T )− pon(H ∧ T ) ≤ 1. (12)
If we make the same mistake we did in the previous examples, and put these
probabilities, belonging to different conditions, together into one formula pre-
scribed for a Kolmogorovian probability theory, we find the same kind of “vio-
lation of the rules of classical probability theory”:
poff( H ) + pon(T)) − poff(H ∧T) = 0.5 + 0.8 > 1, (13)
or
pon(H) + poff(T) = 0.2 + 0.5 6= 1 = poff(1) = poff(H ∨ T). (14)
Consider now how to join probability models (A, poff) and (A, pon). In the
classical probability theory we can join probabilities belonging to separate con-
ditions only by enlarging the event algebra in such a way that it contains not
only the original events but the “conditioning events”, too (Fig. 5)4. Of course,
we can do that only if we know the probabilities of the conditioning events. In
the example of question assume that p(OFF) = 0.5 and p(ON) = 0.5. So, the
unified probability model is (A′, p), where
p(1) = p(2) = p(9) = p(10) = 0.25,
4I am grateful to Miltos Zissis for his warning that Fig. 5 was incorrect in a previous version
of this paper
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Figure 5: The unified algebra of events A′
p(3) = p(8) = 0.1,
p(4) = p(7) = 0.4,
p(OFF) = p(ON) = 0.5, (15)
p(H) = p(6) = 0.35,
p(T) = p(5) = 0.65.
The original probabilities are represented as conditional probabilities (defined
by the Bayes law):
pon(H) =
p(H ∧ON)
p(ON)
=
p(3)
p(ON)
=
0.1
0.5
= 0.2,
pon(T) =
p(T ∧ON)
p(ON)
=
p(4)
p(ON)
=
0.4
0.5
= 0.8,
poff(H) =
p(H ∧OFF)
p(OFF)
=
p(1)
p(OFF)
=
0.25
0.5
= 0.5, (16)
poff(T) =
p(T ∧OFF)
p(OFF)
=
p(2)
p(OFF)
=
0.25
0.5
= 0.5.
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4.2 How to do it in the quantum theory?
Consider a quantum system described in Hilbert space H . The state of the sys-
tem is represented by density operator W . Assume that there are N different
measurementsm1,m2, . . .mN one can carry out on the system. The correspond-
ing observable-operators are denoted by Mˆ1, Mˆ2, . . . MˆN . Let M1,M2, . . .MN
be the spectra of these operators. Introduce the following notation: each set of
measurements
{
mi1 , . . .mis
}
will be identified with a vector η ∈ {0, 1}N , such
that
ηi =
{
1 if mi ∈
{
mi1 , . . .mis
}
,
0 if mi 6∈
{
mi1 , . . .mis
}
.
In this way the conditioning events can be represented in 2{0,1}
N
. For instance,
event “measurement mi is performed” is represented by
{
η |ηi = 1
}
⊂ {0, 1}N ,
event “measurement mi and measurement mj are performed” corresponds to{
η |ηi = 1
}
∩
{
η |ηj = 1
}
,
etc.
Some of these measurements can be incompatible, in the sense that they
cannot be simultaneously carried out. Assume that, according to the quantum
theory, observables belonging to compatible measurements commute. For each
set {mi1 ,mi2 , . . .mis} = {mi}ηi=1 of compatible measurements the quantum
state W determines a Kolmogorovian probability measure over the correspond-
ing Borel sets,
(
B
(×
ηi=1
Mi
)
, µη
)
, where
µη : (Ai)ηi=1 ∈ B
(
×
ηi=1
Mi
)
7→ tr
(
W
∏
ηi=1
Ai
)
. (17)
Now, how can we join these classical probability spaces into one common
classical probability model? The method is known from the classical theory of
probability. Quantum mechanics has nothing special from this point of view!
That is, we need to enlarge the event algebra by the conditioning events and to
define the joint probability measure over this larger algebra of events. In order
to do that, we need to know the probabilities of conditioning events. The values
of these probabilities are the matter of empirical facts. Although, the following
assumption seems to be quite plausible:
Stipulation There is a classical probability measure p˜ on 2{0,1}
N
, such that if
p˜ ({η}) 6= 0 then the corresponding set of operators
{
Mˆi
}
ηi=1
is commuting.
Thus, my assertion is that classical probabilities (17) can be joint into one
Kolmogorovian probability model:
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Theorem 4 There exists a Kolmogorovian probability space
(
M, B(M), p
)
such
that each conditioning event E ∈ 2{0,1}
N
and each outcome event (Ai)ηi=1 can be
represented by an element of B(M), denoted by XE and X(Ai)ηi=1 , respectively,
and
p˜(E) = p(XE), ∀E ∈ 2{0,1}
N
,
µη
(
(Ai)ηi=1
)
= tr
(
W
∏
ηi=1
Ai
)
=
p
(
X(Ai)ηi=1
∩X{η}
)
p(X{η})
,
∀η ∈ {0, 1}N
∀(Ai)ηi=1 ∈ ×
ηi=1
Mi.
Proof The enlarged Boolean algebra of events can be constructed
as a Boolean σ-algebra of Borel sets B(M), where
M =
disjoint⋃
η∈{0,1}N
×
ηi=1
Mi. (18)
An original outcome event Ai ∈ B(Mi) is represented by
disjoint⋃
η∈{0,1}N
ηi=1
( ×
ηj=1
j<i
Mj
)
× Ai ×
( ×
ηk=1
k>i
Mk
)
.
A conditioning event {η} can be identified with
×
ηi=1
Mi.
Now, the joint classical probability model is
(
M, B(M), p
)
, where
the probability measure p is generated by the following rule:
p :

×
ηi=1
Ai

 ∈ B(M) 7→ tr
(
W
∏
ηi=1
Ai
)
· p˜(η). (19)
It is worth mentioning that if η represents incompatible measure-
ments then probability (19) is zero.
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The original probabilities belonging to different particular condition
are also reproduced as conditional probabilities: for example the
probability of an outcome Ai given that measurement mi is carried
out is tr(WAi), and indeed,
p
(⋃disjoint
η∈{0,1}N
ηi=1
(
×
ηj=1
j<i
Mj
)
×Ai ×
(
×
ηk=1
k>i
Mk
))
p
(
×ηi=1Mi
)
=
∑
η∈{0,1}N
ηi=1
tr
(
W
(∏
ηj=1
Idj
)
Ai
)
p˜(η)
∑
η∈{0,1}N
ηi=1
p˜(η)
(20)
=
tr
(
WAi
)∑
η∈{0,1}N
ηi=1
p˜(η)
∑
η∈{0,1}N
ηi=1
p˜(η)
= tr (WAi) .
✷
Let us apply this general method to the EPR experiment. We have 4 possible
measurements a, a′, b, b′. There are 8 different conditioning events symbolized
with the 8 vectors η ∈ {0, 1}4. The probabilities of these conditioning events
are
p˜(0000) = p˜(1000) = p˜(0100) = p˜(0010) = p˜(0001) = p˜(1100) = p˜(0011) = 0,
p˜(1010) = p˜(1001) = p˜(0110) = p˜(0101) =
1
4
.
Each of the four observables has a spectrum consisting from two points
“up” and “down”. Thus, the enlarged event algebra is the Boolean algebra
generated by 81 elementary eventsE ∈ {up, down, none}4. The joint probability
measure is determined by the probabilities of the elementary events. There are
16 elementary events which have non-zero probability:
p(up none up none) = p(up none none up)
= p(none up none up) = p(down none down none)
= p(down none none down) = p(none down none down) =
3
32
,
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p(up none down none) = p(up none none down)
= p(none up none down) = p(down none up none)
= p(down none none up) = p(none down none up) =
1
32
,
p(none down up none ) = p(none up down none) =
1
8
.
To see that this is a consistent representation, let us check one of the prob-
abilities in (8): event A ∧B is represented by subset
XA ∩XB =
{
(up none up none), (up up up none),
(up down up none), (up none up down), (up none up up)
}
.
The probability p(XA ∩XB) =
3
32 + 0 + 0 + 0 + 0 =
3
32 . Condition event a ∧ b
is represented by
Xa ∩Xb =
{
(up none up none), (down none up none),
(down none down none), (up none down none),
(up up up up), (up up up none), . . . (down down down down)
}
and
p(Xa ∩Xb) =
3
32
+
1
32
+
3
32
+
1
32
+ 0 + 0 . . .+ 0 =
1
4
.
As it is required, XA ∩XB ⊂ Xa ∩Xb. Consequently,
tr(WAB) =
p(XA ∩XB ∩Xa ∩Xb)
p(Xa ∩Xb)
=
p(XA ∩XB)
p(Xa ∩Xb)
=
3
32
1
4
=
3
8
,
as it was expected.
Conclusions
The analysis of the above examples and Theorem 4 unanimously tell us that
quantum mechanics, regarded as a physical theory about empirical facts of our
world, does not demand to supersede the classical theory of probability. It is
needless to do that and, what is more, any attempt at the empirical founda-
tion of the quantum probability theory seems to be contradictory. Like it or
not, quantum mechanics is connected with the empirical facts about the world,
which it is supposed to be applied to, through relative frequencies. But those
“probabilities” that are presented by the quantum probability theory can hardly
be interpreted as relative frequencies of events. And whether we like it or not,
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quantum logic is nothing else but an algebraic structure isomorphic with the
algebra of events underlying the quantum probability theory. So, if quantum
probability theory has nothing to do to reality then quantum logic is meaning-
less, too. Quantum logic and quantum probability theory remain fascinating
mathematical theories but without any relevance to our real world.
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